

WESTERN SOCIO-HISTORY = UNIVERSAL HISTORY
An exploration in realistic development
theory

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1. Introduction: the four transformations

The basic point to be explored here are the implications of a relatively obvious hypothesis: to the world in general, and to the West in particular, Western socio-history is not merely the history of the West. The West is the forerunner of humanity, consequently Western socio-history is universal history in disguise, as evidenced by the circumstance that so many others are following in the footsteps of the West. Western past is their present; Western present is their future; Western future is for the West to create - on behalf of humankind.

To explore this we have to study Western socio-history in a developmental perspective, and in a global perspective, relating it to the other parts of the world. That is indeed a big order, very holistic and very global. But I have a feeling that it simply has to be done in order to gain a deeper understanding of the present development problématique. The following is an invitation to join the author in one such exploration. I am sure it can be done in many other ways, but what follows at least has the virtue of opening for an analysis of a number of problems related to the development debate.

There are limits to holism, some choice has to be made. What aspects of history should be seen as particularly significant? I have chosen the class/caste structure, its characteristics in some periods and its transformations from one period to the next. More particularly, I have taken as point of departure standard western medieval/feudal society, with its division into Clergy, Aristocracy /landed gentry, Merchants/Artisans/Burghers, Peasants/Workers. In the following, for simplicity, I shall refer to them as Clergy, Aristocracy, Merchants and Peasants respectively.

But this is not everything there was in the old society. Society is not only structured according to class, there are also four other significant ways of dividing human kind: gender, age, race, ethnicity. Class is above all a way of dividing men who are not too young and not too old and belong to the dominant racial

and ethnic group. Not belonging to that group means that one is marginal. Hence, in addition to the four classes/castes, we also have to operate with a fifth marginal group and the composition is already given: women, children and very old people, racial/ethnic minorities such as gipsies, jews and arabs. Except for being young, there is no way of escaping from these characteristics: once a marginal, always a marginal. Actually, one may also put those seriously handicapped by somatic or mental diseases in this category of marginals unless they are able to prove that they can make a healthy-ill-healthy career relatively quickly.

This gives us four classes and a marginalised group, in extremely complex relations. Out of that complexity, through historical time, I then identify four major successive transformations, in the 17th, 18th, 19th and 20th centuries respectively, each of them lasting about one century. I am certainly not insisting on dates or duration. This is mainly to make two points that are important for the following: the total process involving the four transformations has taken considerable time, at least four centuries - and the transformations have been successive, not simultaneous.

By "the four transformations" I mean the following:

(1) Aristocracy against Clergy, 17th century, separating State and Church, through many transition formulas that actually were enacted much earlier, gradually placing King, Military and Law as high or higher than Church.

(2) Merchants/Burghers against Church and Aristocracy, 18th century, gradually placing Capital (as mobile capital, together with the mobility of the other production factors and the products) as high or higher than King, Military, Law and Church. Being neither God's servants nor noble by birth, capital holders could only follow Capital, on its way up through patterns of individual mobility, legitimised through a system of individual human rights for human beings and citizens.

(3) Peasants/Workers against Church, Aristocracy and Merchants, 19th century (and well into the 20th): trade unions, communist, socialist, social democratic parties, working parties in general

and parties for small farmers and peasants making it possible for working class men at least to place their sons in the niches of the social structure built by the other three (but based materially on the work of group n° 4).

(4) Women, the young, minorities and foreigners of all kinds, the handicapped, against Church, Aristocracy, Merchants and Workers, 20th century, starting with the right to vote for women, fighting for the entry into the society from which they had been excluded, followed by the revolts of the young, the handicapped, the foreign workers, etc.

Perfectly well knowing that this is grosso modo, the perspective nevertheless raises some important questions about the Western social formation.

First, what came of these groups, what happened to them when the social order was transformed? When the Church was no longer on the top, for instance, it was no longer the same Church. Obviously, many of them left the Church and may be said to have been transformed into intelligentsia and intellectuals, artists, professionals of various kinds. In short, people who may be operating with their hands but according to very explicit verbal prescriptions, known to the initiated, obtained through university education. I make a distinction here: the intellectuals create such rules, the intelligentsia practise according to them. The intellectuals retain their creativity, the intelligentsia live off the creativity capital made by others. Artists are more like intellectuals: They are the antenna of society, sensitive feelers towards the future, reporting structures and processes in space and time and human relations to nature, to other humans and to the superhuman different from the way they are perceived by their contemporaries. Of course, there are also artists who like the intelligentsia are perfectly satisfied practising their crafts with no particular creativity or challenge: they are the decorators of society.

What happened to the aristocrats? Of course, many of them remained as landed gentry and with the military as an institution. But there were important new positions to fill: the State with

its rapidly increasing bureaucracy in addition to the cabinet as the King's advisors, the King being a transition figure serving as an umbrella for the transformation of aristocrats from feudal lords to cabinet ministers and top bureaucrats in the more prestigious ministries (for instance, foreign affairs). Of course, in no way did this exclude top positions as administrators in the "private sector".

What became of the merchants? The commercial sector? It is a telling sign of their power and of the nature of the Western social formation that they just remained where they were, sticking to their trade literally speaking. The major difference was the tremendous mobility that set in, of factors, products, and people, the latter in geographical space and social space, and upwards. The merchants wanted to come up and become the equals of Church and Aristocracy and their successors. Needless to say, all these transformations were important in the transition from what was predominantly commercial capitalism based on agricultural produce and artisanal products to a capitalism based on industrial products with an even sharper division between city, town and countryside and gradually between metropolitan powers and colonies. Also, over time family dominated companies had to yield to companies in principle run by the shareholders, the boards of trustees and professionals rather than the members of the family.

So, this is the drama of the Western social formation: the Church waning, the Universities waxing; the transfer of power from the Land to Town, from the King and the Courts via the King and the Cabinet to the President and the Cabinet, into the State with its Bureaucracy, Capital gradually taking the shape of Corporations. The working class created a counterpoint to all of this, at least for some time: the Trade Unions, with the strike as their instrument of power. But institutions die slowly. It is interesting to see how the Church is still there, wielding normative power although in competition with the secular forces centered in the Universities. And how, with all this going on, the merchants and their successors are busily expanding and deepening their base, contractual power, relative to the customers, the State, and - in an increasingly problematic manner - to organised labour. Out of all of this arose,

then, the BCI complex of Bureaucrats, Capitalists and Intelligentsia, protected by the Police and the Military against internal and external threats respectively, and for internal and external coercive power against recalcitrant forces, be they striking labour or peoples in the territories designated as "colonies", unwilling to play the roles assigned to them. But to this should be added one extremely important additional institution: the Party system, meaningless if there is not in addition some kind of parliament.

I see the parliament essentially as a way of multi-lateralising the exercise of power, of expanding the circle of those who can legitimately participate in the decision-making process, and a way of making that process more transparent. On the one hand is the king, or the chief, making bilateral deals with the members of their court, possibly pitting one against the other; on the other hand the effort by others to expand the circle, making the process more participatory. This was a long-lasting process in Western history, essentially including the first two layers of feudal society, then rapidly accelerating with the merchants/burghers not only knocking on the door but building the modern parliaments.

Parliaments reached the population through popular vote and indirect power, delegating power to representatives, the members of parliament. With the rapidly expanding agenda of issues, the positions taken on these issues tended to crystallise and polarise; bundles of positions becoming over time the platforms for political parties which again, in turn, became the modern instruments through which the four transformations that in my view are basic in understanding the Western social formation could be channelled into parliamentary processes. They are still going on, but in this century, the focus has been, of course, on the third and fourth transformation and the gradual expansion of the right to vote to working class males, to women, to increasingly younger members of society, to racial/ethnic minorities, not to mention majorities, even to foreigners.

And this is more or less as far as we have come. All those institutions of the past are still there in the Western storehouse; all the transformations are still going on. Eruption and sedimentation; history as geology, quick and slow. Mostly slow.

2. Western socio-history as universal history

There are limits to globalism, but if this type of exploration is to be of any value at all, I now have to try to trace the effects of western social transformations in other corners of the world. The reader will find on the next page a formidable looking table, which actually is very simple. What has been done is simply this, I have used the division of the world into four worlds: the private but partly also public capitalist and democratic North-West, the state and bureaucratic socialist and to a large extent dictatorial North-East, the South-West or the Third world of essentially poor countries, former colonies with their effort to realise a new economic order, and the fourth world in the South-East, East and South-East Asia, characterised by the Japanese driving to become N° 1, Ichi-ban - as an example for the rest.

I have then tried to characterise the power structures, or class/caste structures, in order to discuss their transformations. The reader will find in the upper left hand corner a highly concentrated version of what has been said above. In the upper right hand corner is an effort to characterise the class/caste structure of the socialist world today, knowing that the point of departure was approximately the same as in the First world, the classical European feudal formation with Clergy, Aristocracy and so on. Then, in the bottom left hand corner, two systems have been singled out for attention from the Third world: South America and South Asia. For South America the assumption is that Iberian colonisation left a very strong imprint of the classical European social formation for the simple reason that the Iberian peninsula in general, and Spain in particular, did not really undergo the first and the second of the social transformations explored for the First world and, consequently had tremendous difficulties also with the third and the fourth. For South Asia, the classical hindu cast system is used as a basis for exploration. And the same approach is taken for the Fourth world with the classical Chinese and Japanese systems.

Of course there is more in the world than this. Thus, in the Third world what is missing is a discussion of the class/caste structure for the arab/moslem world and for the tribal peoples

TABLE: WESTERN SOCIO-HISTORY = UNIVERSAL HISTORY?

		WEST	EAST
N O R T H		<u>First world:</u> capitalist	<u>Second world:</u> socialist
		1 Clergy → Intelligentsia	1 Partocracy (JMP)
		2 Aristocracy → Bureaucracy (Military, Police)	2 Technocracy (BCI)
		3 Merchants → Corporations	3 Workers
	4 Peasants/workers → { Farmers Workers Citizens	4 Peasants	
	5 Women Elderly Minorities Foreigners } → Citizens	5 Minorities/majorities (tribals, indigenous) foreigners, dissidents	
S O U T H		<u>Third world:</u> NIEO	<u>Fourth world :</u> Ichi-ban
		<u>South America</u>	<u>China</u>
		1 Clergy	1 <u>Shih</u> nobility scholars warriors
		2 Aristocracy Latifundio Military	2 <u>Nung</u> farmers
	3 Merchants	3 <u>Kung</u> artisans	
	4 Peasants/workers	4 <u>Shang</u> merchants	
	5 Women Young, old Minorities/maj- orities, (tribals, indigenous) Foreigners	5 Women Young Tribals/ indigenous Foreigners	
		<u>Japan</u>	
		1 <u>Shi</u>	
		2 <u>Nō</u>	
		3 <u>Kō</u>	
		4 <u>Shō</u>	
		5 Burakomin Women Young Tribals/ Indigenous Foreigners	

in the Amer-Indian societies of the Americas, in Africa, and in the Pacific (Polynesia, Micronesia, Melanesia). This will be taken up later in this section; there are limits to how much can be put into one table! And the same applies to the Fourth world; although China and Japan are by far the most important social formations, there are certainly also other countries in that region. I will attempt to show, however, that what is in the table is already sufficient as a basis for understanding much of what is going on in the world today under the heading of "development".

One peculiar factor will strike the reader as it has struck the author: why this number 4? Why does it seem not only fruitful to think in terms of four classes for the members of society, adding an additional fifth country for the marginals, but this four-tier system is even handed to the social scientist on a platter, through the traditional divisions of Hindu, Chinese and Japanese societies? And as to the occident: there are obviously not only three estates in society, that would leave almost everybody who later on also were to become citizens out. As a matter of fact, the three top layers might account for ten to twenty percent of the male population and the bottom two for eighty to ninety percent. So a somewhat distorted view of society would be needed to think of the West in terms of three layers only, not invoking the four-tier model with the fifth class of marginals.

This fifth group is a rather mixed category and rather ambiguous. Thus, there are obviously women everywhere in the system except (apart from illegitimately) with the clergy and the monks. But even as wives of the wielders of power, they may be marginalised, as is very well-known. The same applies to the very young and the very old whereas the racial/ethnic minorities (sometimes they are majorities), the tribals and the indigenous are more often "kept in their place", "place" also having a clear geographic meaning.

Let us then proceed world by world, starting with the Second world, asking the question: What actually happened in connection with the socialist transformation, using the ideas developed in connection with the transformation of the First world

(which is what we actually have had in mind all the time when talking about the "Western social formation" and Western socio-history.)

Russia had a particularly vicious version of the classical European formation, a feudal system with only rights and very few duties at the top and only duties and very few rights at the bottom - with serfdom lasting right up to 1864 (like slavery in the U.S.) At the same time a pre-capitalist formation was taking shape, a remarkable feature of the classical formation in Eastern Europe and Southern Europe - as opposed to North-Western Europe - being the ability of the merchants to transform themselves and evolve further even if the first and second transformations in the vertical structures of society had not taken place.

One way of analysing the socialist revolution starting in 1917 would be to conceive of it as a gigantic effort to make all the four transformations at the same time. A success up to a certain point, a failure in other respects. The result in the present phase is stagnation, with a solid machinery of normative and punitive power presiding over the very special structure that was the result, claiming - with normative power - that it is "socialist" and punishing - with punitive power, even very harshly - those who claim it is not, not to mention those who claim that it ought not to be.

In principle what happened was that the three top layers were eliminated "as a class"; as social persons, many of them also as physical persons, by being killed, exiled internally or externally, as refugees. They had been the wielders of normative, punitive and contractual power on the basis of Culture, Military/Police (the power of destruction) and Economy (the power of construction). What was left was power over power, politics, the power to decide which forms of power to use and in which proportions. In principle the slate was relatively clean. Decisions could follow some blue-print in Marxist-Leninist theory. Normative power was to be vested in the party which would be responsible for development of a socialist culture. Punitive power would continue where it was, with the military and the police, the GPU/NKVD/KGB being continuations of the tsarist secret police, the Okhrana. The Red Army later on

became more like the tsarist army, but both institutions incorporated a solid element of normative power as party appointed political commissars.

Consequently, just like in the classical European social formation, there was a heavy concentration of normative and punitive power on top, in the top class represented with the word partocracy standing for the \mathbb{P} MP-complex, \mathbb{P} (Russian P) standing for the Party .

But a society cannot build on the basis of Culture, Military and Police alone, on only normative and punitive power. There has to be an economy, and there has to be some contractual element. The blue-print included socialisation of the production, and socialisation was interpreted as étatisation, statism, "public sector"-controlled production, guided by planning rather than the market. The result was technocracy: the BCI-complex, only with the difference that C in this case stands for state corporations. They are big and numerous, but they are not that different from the corresponding pillars of First world society. Moreover, indeed, nor is the \mathbb{P} MP-complex unknown in the First world. The difference can perhaps be formulated as follows: in the socialist formation the partocracy is so explicitly, unashamedly on top of the system; the partocracy having the final word not only in ruling over workers and peasants and marginals, but also in the countless conflicts with technocracy. In the First world the military and the police are parts of the bureaucratic complex, and this total complex, also referred to as the state, is in principle controlled by popularly elected parliaments, and a government responsible to the parliament. There is a multi-party rather than a single-party system. But before one becomes too lyrical about that difference and starts talking too much about democracy versus dictatorship it is worthwhile to draw attention to two factors.

Thus, although the communist party in the socialist formation exercises single-party control over the total formation in a way that may be referred to as a party dictatorship there could still be considerable democracy inside the party: open discussion, votes, delegates, up and down consultations, even factions (although they may be more implicit), an executive committee responsible

to an elected body. And, to take a corresponding argument in connection with the First world: even in a multi-party system there may be a hidden single party system, a consensus among parties that together constitute the majority that starts operating when critical issues come up or are being discussed, such as foreign policy, security matters, questions of faith and loyalty. Majority coalition for crisis may behave in a very undemocratic manner, excluding dangerous opposition parties not only from decision-making but also from the information that would constitute the basis for decisions. And that coalition may also have at its disposal the military and the police in what could be referred to as a hidden autocratic structure. Conclusion: in the socialist formation in the Second world autocracy is explicitly on the top, in the capitalist/democratic formation in the First world autocracy is implicitly, in the background, to be mobilised in crises.

But then there is another characteristic of the socialist formation: a very clear demarcation line between the non-manual occupations in partocracy and technocracy on the one hand, and then the manual occupations held by workers and peasants. In addition to that the peasants have a position markedly inferior to the workers. Classical socialist doctrine in this regard is very similar to classical feudal and classical capitalist: make the peasants produce as cheap foodstuff as possible by paying them as little as possible, by fragmenting and isolating them as much as possible. The two typical Soviet institutions, the kolkhoz and sovkhoz (organisations for collective farming, the latter being directly state-controlled) are ways of socialising production, but also ways of controlling peasants. The workers have access to city life, more money, cheap food, more mobility. The typical technique for Northern European transformations in the middle of this century, letting the peasants follow in the wake of the substantial increase in material living conditions that came as a result of the struggle of the working class through trade union formation and strikes has not been practised in the Soviet Union.

As has been pointed out often, the single party dictatorship is not of or by the proletariat, but over the proletariat. But I do not think women can be said to be a marginalised category in the socialist countries today. They are exploited in the sense

of being forced by the structure to carry out two jobs; serving the family in general and the husband in particular at home, and having an occupation/profession in society. But, as to the latter: the fourth transformation, women doing work formerly only being done by men, seems to have been quite successful, of course helped by the scarcity of men after the terrible anti-Soviet genocide carried out by the nazis in the Second World War (20 million, surprisingly few are aware that Hitler wanted not only to eliminate Jews and gipsies and those with mental disorders, but also a very high number of Russians in order to create space for colonisation). What is missing, as mentioned, are men doing the work of women, particularly at home. And I also doubt that non-white minorities in general and non-Russian minorities in particular in any way can be said to have the same access to the higher layers of society, particularly to the upper rungs of partocracy, as the Russians.

So, what happened in terms of the four transformations? This was telescoping of history, indeed. With the top three layers to a large extent eliminated the social system analysts would immediately suspect that they would have to be recreated very quickly, in order to carry out the functions of normative, punitive and contractual power. They had to be created from scratch, and the system was perhaps not clever enough in making use of persons who had been eliminated "as a class". The socialist countries in Eastern Europe did this to a larger extent, but then theirs was not a bloody revolution in the October 1917 sense, but a transformation also engendered exogenously, through the presence of a Red Army. Hence, what should have been liberation of workers and peasants, became a rather major transformation of the upper layers exploiting workers and peasants, repressing them politically while at the same time guaranteeing satisfaction of their basic material needs, to a large extent abolishing misery.

The Revolution was made in the name of the third transformation. It was supposedly a socialist formation putting workers and peasants on top, not necessarily over anybody but at least on their side. But this was the transformation that did not take place; what did take place were the other three transformations, the first and the second and the fourth, the transformations in the name of which the Revolution had not been conducted. And these transformations came out in a different manner from what had happened in the West.

There was separation of State and Church in the sense that the Orthodox church almost disappeared in a physical sense (the churches), if not spiritually. But the party took the place of the church, and fulfilled many of its functions in the closely coordinated dual party-state system characteristic of the Soviet Union. And although the classical aristocracy was abolished, a new aristocracy came in with the interesting honorific tovarishtch - Genosse, Comrade - mainly used at the top of socialist society, and when addressing them from lower down. Private sector merchants were abolished but reappeared as powerful state employees, etc.

I let that do as one variation of the theme explored: something that may happen when the transformations are carried out too quickly. Let us then proceed to exactly the opposite: What happened, or rather did not happen, in South America which is like asking what happened, or did not happen, in the country that left its imprint on South America, Spain. Imagine that we consider Spain as a country that did not have the first and second transformations. Until very recently, in fact so recently that one might even say they are going on today? What kind of country would we get?

The answer is rather obvious. When the clergy is not transformed, it remains clergy and a country gets a high number of priests and a powerful church. When the aristocracy is not transformed, it remains aristocracy and does what aristocracy always used to do: as landed gentry (but not always so gentle), running latifundios and/or becoming military. Maybe even the first son would inherit the latifundio, the second son join the military, and if there is a third son, he could be given to the church as an extra insurance for the family. Out of that would come exactly what even today in Spain is known as los poderes fácticos, those with real power: the church, the latifundistas, and the military. It all has a ring of the 18th century, or even before : the 17th and the 16th, so replete, as in European history in general, with the struggle between the sacred and the secular, and between central power and local power. In the classical configuration, one can still sense the alliance between the three poderes fácticos, not only centrally but also, and perhaps particularly, at the local level - not necessarily in

the sense of the village but in the sense of the region, the province. Go to Andalucia today; they are still there.

One particularly important consequence of this lack of transformation would be the low level of articulation of the new forces: intellectuals/professionals/artists; administrators/bureaucrats; political parties/parliaments. It is not that they have been missing, they have been there and are there, both in southern Europe in general (and Spain in particular) and in South America. But they may be secondary in power to los poderes fácticos and, both as a cause and a consequence of this, they may be secondary in quality. Why did so many Spanish intellectuals/artists end up in France/Mexico, just like South American intellectuals/artists? Because France and Mexico, (which after all had the 1910-11 revolution, before the revolution in Russia, October 1917) offered a more fertile soil for their activities, and a more appreciative public permitted to enjoy secular pursuits of Truth and Beauty. It is not that Spain and South America in any sense were incapable of producing top quality, only that they were incapable of consuming their products.

On the other hand, the commercial classes could evolve further, gradually transforming themselves from running commercial capitalism to running industrial/financial capitalism. For this they needed workers and there was always an excess from the fourth layer in society. Spain came at an early stage to its industrial revolution thus creating a working class within a framework that in a sense was still mediaeval. In the 1930's the social formation in Spain was probably not that different from that of Russia or Eastern, South Eastern and Southern Europe in general. A revolution might have had a chance if it had not been for two rather important differences relative to 1917; 1917 had already happened so the upper classes were more than adequately warned, and the other side had not been weakened by a world war. The commercial bourgeoisie would be supported by all three major pillars of society - the church, the landowners and the military - in the struggle against the small people of the fourth layer, the peasants and the workers. The latter had the power of numbers and a simple calculus: "we have only our chains to lose". The former had the power of ideas (the church), exchange (the landowners, the factory owners) and coercion (the military). Of course

they did not have monopoly power: there was the powerful idea of Marxism on the other side, and many remained loyal to the Republic. By and large the outcome was given in advance: a third transformation did not take place, the society that had not had a first or second transformation was still sufficiently strong to block the third (leaving alone the fourth which was not to start until about forty years later).

In describing the Civil War of Spain in these terms, there is an underlying assumption that the external aid to the belligerent parties by and large balanced each other. This assumption may not be totally correct. But another version of the same idea is probably correct: had only one side given support, then the war would have been decided quickly and in favour of the side supported. And this is the history of South America. The parties to the conflict are about the same, with one major exception: the fifth layer, the indigenous, are at least potentially, and in some cases already today, the overwhelming majority of the population. This also makes the South American societies much more complicated than Southern Europe: at the bottom an indigenous population together with imported non-white people (the blacks from Africa, the browns from India, the yellow from China); then there is the Iberian layer carrying the social code described above; and then on top of all that a yanqui layer of technocrats running a BCIMP complex, more or less the same as that of the First World in general, very small and certainly very far from rooted in these countries.

For that is exactly what is missing in this type of social formation from the point of view of western socio-history: the BCI-complex, with the supporting military and police institutions (as a part of the bureaucracy), all of it to some extent responsible to a political decision-making machinery based on elected parliaments and an independent judiciary. Without an efficient state machinery, a real bureaucracy and without a well-trained, even creative intelligentsia that can put its professionalism and innovative energy at the disposal of bureaucracy and corporations, no BCI-complex is possible, no technocracy. Without that no transformation from agraria to industria on a really large scale would be possible,

and the country would likely remain an exporter of one or two crops depending on natural endowments - coffee beans and sugar, wine and olives or beef; minerals. Such exports would be compatible with a stable property structure and a stable knowledge structure, both protected by the military - in other words compatible with a static and classical formation. Industrialism presupposes a level of dynamism, mobility of production factors and products, of the buyers and sellers and their families, geographically and socially. Which all adds up to the somewhat overworked dichotomy in development theory: traditional versus modern. What has been done here is only to relate that useful dichotomy to very concrete social processes.

At this point the significance of the modern political machinery, with parties and parliaments, has to be brought into the picture. I would conceive of it predominantly as a way of blunting the tremendous class contradictions between the first, second and third layers on the one hand, and the fourth and fifth on the other. "Organise yourself into a party and try to get the majority" is a formula with a certain plausibility. But the formula presupposes that the class contradictions have already been blunted so that there is less blatant fear on top, and hatred at the bottom. Otherwise the reaction of the first, second and third layers is exactly that of the Spanish and South American situation during the last century: an endless series of military coups d'état, more or less successful. Most of them have had one thing in common: the abolition or suspension of the party/parliamentary process. And almost without exception, after the golpe, the three poderes fácticos are still on top with an admixture of a modern, industrial/financial, urban-based capitalist element, excluding everybody else. The other instrument of countervailing power designed by the fourth layer, trade unions, are usually either abolished or heavily disciplined. The result is exactly Spain during the Franco period and South America far beyond. Needless to say, this will make the contradictions even sharper. The fear of a revolutionary rather than an evolutionary process will increase. In all likelihood we get the former, and we are in a well-known vicious circle.

In South America, the great exceptions are México and Cuba, the latter being relatively similar to the Soviet Union, the former

being similar only to itself. Cuba is much smaller than the Soviet Union, possibly one reason why there seems to be less difference between workers and peasants. But there is a solid technocracy and partocracy on the top, only that there are many mechanisms for articulation of grievances within the system, although not within a party system. As in México, the church plays a secondary role and, unlike México, latifundismo has been abolished or taken over by the state (as in the Soviet Union). México is in a sort of middle position between western traditional (inherited from Spain), western modern (influenced by the United States), and the Soviet formation with its de facto single party system in the hands of the PRI, with the very appropriate name Partido Revolucionario Institucional (a name which could apply to the Soviet party).

Let us then ask a question: if Spain (and to a lesser extent Portugal) are pilot countries for South America, carrying so much of the responsibility for the western imprint on those countries, then why have these countries today almost made all the way as western modern formations? Put differently, when Portugal and Spain underwent drastic changes in the mid-1970's - in a revolutionary manner from 1974 on, (and perhaps relatively unsuccessfully) in Portugal and in Spain in an evolutionary manner from the death of Franco, November 1975, but started earlier (and rather successfully) - then what was the reason? Was it the yearning of the populations for freedom, that is for a change of the polity from autocratic to democratic patterns - free elections, parliaments and free trade unions? Or was it the yearning of capital for corporate profit and economic growth in general, unhampered by the traditionalism of the poderes fácticos and its concomitant, the inadequacy of state bureaucracies and a local intelligentsia, untrained in business administration? Of course it was both, one explanation does not exclude the other.

The pressures for the first, second and third transformations all made themselves felt, and both the Salazar and Franco regimes were unable to accommodate them. At the same time, their neighbours to the north were all different, and these northern neighbours descended upon their coasts in swarms, in the millions, as numerous as the populations themselves and also made some impact as carriers of the joint message of freedom (at least to travel) and wealth (at least to travel). In other words, both liberal and

marxist theories would have something valuable to offer in explaining these processes. And correspondingly, it stands to reason that the same will happen in South America, sooner or later, possibly with a Spanish rather than Portuguese model as a guide. The assumption, however, is that South American countries are sufficiently western to make their social history a replication of Western social history. That assumption may turn out to be totally wrong in the countries where the fifth layer is of any significance, even being the majority of the population, and still a carrier of non-Western patterns. Sendero Luminoso may prove to be a well-chosen name.

So let us now turn to these non-Western patterns, all the time following the project of the Table. We are turning to the South and East Asian traditions, to India, China and Japan. A glance at the Table brings out the major points, so important that it is strange that they are so often overlooked in Development theory: the Indian, meaning Hindu pattern, is very similar to the traditional Western one, whereas the Chinese and Japanese patterns are very similar to each other and different from the Western/Hindu. More particularly, the Hindu system has the clergy/intellectuals on top, then comes the warrior caste, then the merchants and then the peasants/workers. In China/Japan, however, there being no God there is no real clergy either, but intellectuals are certainly on top, together with nobility and the warrior caste (as opposed to mercenary soldiers). But, and this is the big difference: the merchants are at the bottom, since so much of the responsibility for economic activity was in the hands of the feudal kings. In between are the farmers and the artisans, the latter later to be transformed into workers.

Given the tremendous western impact, two centuries of Raj in India, the Opium wars and gunboat diplomacy in China, and the indication of a similar threat to Japan (Commodore Perry and his grey ships in 1854) in Japan, one can almost read off from the Table what the consequences would be. Thus, India would adjust easily. All that was needed was for the brahmins to become less concerned with transcendental and traditional matters and more like modern intellectuals; for the kshatriya (jointly with the brahmins) to enter into the Indian Civil Service, not the military and police

branches only; and for the vaishyas, particularly the banyas, to continue what they had always done, trading, gradually making the transition from commercial to industrial/financial capitalism. Of shudras there are many, serving as peasants and workers and for the most menial jobs, there was that really bottom layer of society, the true outcasts, the pariahs.

So, India adjusted. The "brown sahibs" did adapt and they became exactly, as the saying goes, more British than the British themselves. No real transformation of a social structure was necessary. The inter-caste relations could remain more or less as they were, only the jobs had to change content. A functional change was needed, not a structural change. That change was only too easy, and precisely for that reason not very profound. No real transformation was needed; no revolution.

This, then, immediately begs the question: why did the same not happen in South America? After all, the transition from traditional to modern in the West can also be seen as a functional rather than structural transformation. The clergy were only on top in a limited sense in the ancien régime; not now either. There were two power ladders, one sacred, one secular. Correspondingly, the powers of the state are still seen as superior to the powers of capital, even in the citadel of capitalism, the United States of America. The intellectuals are not on top, nor are professionals or artists - but they are on a parallel ladder. In some contexts that ladder has priority, most clearly seen in the case of the physicians (particularly the surgeons of hearts and brains), in general not. Hence the ranking order was - by and large - maintained.

The reason why this transformation did not take place, consequently, is probably not the structural constraint deriving from a change in relative point, but located in two other rather obvious factors. First, North America was colonised from North-Western Europe where the first and second transformations had taken place whereas South America was colonised from South-Western Europe where this was not the case. The role models were different, the social imprint different. Second, to anybody with some knowledge of social history, it was more than obvious that the third transformation could easily follow in the wake of the first and the second. This

would make the elites in both South America and South Asia very hesitant about the first two transformations. But the South Asian leaders might have hoped that the caste barriers were sufficient to prevent layer n°s four and five from surging forward, flooding the structure lightly transformed by the change of the functions of the first three layers. The leaders in South America might not have felt thus protected. The Spaniards were thrown out in the period 1810 (Argentina, Chile) - 1842 (Dominican Republic), and the Portuguese from Brazil (1884), but their social imprint was left behind. In a sense one cannot but admire the tenacity of the poderes fácticos in South America, keeping in mind that they must have been greatly inspired by the ultra-stability of their former "mother" countries.

The French adage "plus ça change, plus c'est la même chose" applies better to India than to most other countries, given the tremendous flexibility of the rich Hindu culture. In China and Japan the situation was different. There is no way in which these two countries could simply keep the structure and transform the functions, and still yield a modern Western social formation. The material for the intellectuals/professionals/artists and administrators/bureaucrats was certainly present at the top of society. But the third ingredient in the Western social formation, the corporate/capitalist element was at the bottom! Somehow it had to be hoisted up to the top in order for a society to replicate the Western social formation if not Western social history. For that to happen the point of departure was too different. How could that be achieved?

In Japan, this is precisely what happened: during the end of the Tokugawa Era, merchant capital was accumulating at the same time as the samurai were in decline. It was the background for the famous shi-shō alliance, whereby the merchants gave rice stipends to the samurai, the intellectuals/warriors, sustaining them by paying their livelihood. In short, the BCI-complex was already there as a symbiosis that had emerged entirely endogenously. How the merchants managed to get out of their "gipsy" image and into something as elevated as the Japanese corporation today, is a long story in which the mariage de convénience with the shi must have played a rather major role. However that may be, in order to

carry out the modern functions from the top, a truly structural transformation was needed, and took place. The result is Japan, today.

What happened in China was very different. The entire Chinese system was in crisis, not only the intellectuals and warriors. A total transformation was called for, and in addition a fight against Western and Japanese imperialism. The transformation can be seen as a three-stage process: the Guomindang period 1911-1949, the Mao Zedong Period 1949-1976, and the third period after the death of Mao Zedong which we are now experiencing. Of course, in the first period, power and wealth were no longer with the Emperor and the mandarinates, but came into the hands of the Big Warlords, the Big Landowners, and Big Urban-based. It was the task of the millenia-old Chinese bureaucracy to be at the disposal of the three 'big's' as before it had been at the disposal of the Emperor. That the system became utterly corrupt, oppressive, and rotten, almost goes without saying. Maybe the Guomindang period should be seen rather as the end of the Emperor system, in the gutter, than as the beginning of something new, the moral qualities of the first president of the Chinese Republic notwithstanding?

There is no doubt that the second period brought in the people, the peasants and the workers, and in colossal numbers. Nor is there any doubt that the Maozedong revolution was made against the merchants, unlike the preceding transformation rhythm, in an effort to liberate their creative energies. But, in other terms: this means that the net outcome of the Maozedong transformation was a modern China without the third leg of the technocratic tripod, the corporations. The idea was to run the economy on the basis of bureaucracy, intelligentsia, and above all the Local level, mobilising popular forces in a myriad of small-scale efforts within the setting provided by the People's Communes (from 1958). Conceivably this is the basic factor the Chinese process had to catch up with after the death of Mao Zedong: the creation of a corporate element, a "private sector", if you like. There is the famous slogan of the Four Modernizations: of agriculture, industry, the military and science - but the keyword here is probably "modernization" rather than the four specific fields. Both in the agricultural and industrial domains basic changes are taking place in the sense that a private sector is

emerging both for production and distribution, and intellectuals are no doubt also gearing their activities more in this direction. This may or may not have taken place at the expense of the "public sector," based on the planning of production, distribution and consumption in the People's Republic. But it has definitely taken place at the expense of the local sector.

Let me try to summarize. The Russian Revolution was an effort to make all four transformations in the name of the third and ended up doing the first, second and the fourth, falling considerably short precisely on the third. The South American non-transformation was exactly that: neither the first, nor the second, nor the third, nor the fourth - and relatively successful at that, albeit with tremendous variations within the continent. South Asia was the clever pupil in the Western development = universal modernisation class, managing to keep the social structure basically in tact, yet transforming the functions. But for Japan and China there were considerable departures from the Western process.

The logic is different, yet the two countries were definitely heading in the direction of the BCI-complex. They had the BI part on top, hence no problem particularly as there was no transcendently-oriented religious tradition for Western "rationality" to supersede. The first transformation, hence, was not needed. By Western standards these were already secular states, neither confucianism nor buddhism having any place for a God bestowing salvation on sinners with His grace. Nor did Japanese shintoism, which was used to sanctify the State, (rendering service for the State being almost sacred); nor Chinese daoism with its dialectical nature philosophy.

Within this setting, to the extent to which the second, third and fourth transformations in the Western sense ever took place is open to discussion. I would argue that they are strongly based on individualism, and that Japan is almost the negation of individualism, the group or collectivity at various levels being the social atom. What is quite clear is that after the defeat of Japan in the Second World War, the U.S. occupation forces tried to impose the Western socio-historical process with a human rights tradition, political parties

and a parliament, free trade unions, and the dissolution of the power of two of the poderes fácticos in the Iberian tradition: the landlords and the military. In addition Japan had a creation of its own, the zaibutsu, a conglomerate of cooperating economic institutions of different types (hence, not the cartel, with which it is often compared); these were also the objects of dismantling exercises. The latter was not successful. The land reform probably was, but as to the military it is better to postpone any judgement. To what extent political parties/parliament are really important in the Japanese decision-making process is certainly a subject of debate.

In China the creation of a BCI-complex came a century later than in Japan, and in stages. On the other hand, China had something that certainly has to do with the third transformation, in granting real citizenship, even dignity on the common man, the worker and the peasant. As in the case of Japan, the Confucian tradition would certainly stand in the way of the fourth transformation for women, and a high level of xenophobia would have the same effect for foreigners. In addition to that Japan also has its own pariah class, the burakumin, a group associated with leather-work and consequently not too dissimilar from pariahs in the Hindu sense.

Conclusion of the conclusion: We have dealt with six social processes, one of them, the model process for development because of the power position of the West, the other five more or less imitating this process. Two of them are clearly within the Occident: the Soviet/Eastern European process and the Southern European/South American process; one of them telescoping the standard western process, the other either not getting off the ground or doing so very late. Then there is the Hindu space, eminently suited for a transformation and for that reason not really being transformed. Finally, there is the Oriental space with a different socio-logic, creating their BCI-complexes in their own ways. Interestingly enough, the country that was most transformed through this process, Japan, never talks of itself as having had a revolution - the term "Meiji Restoration" being used for the events of 1868- whereas the processes associated with the names of Gandhi and Mao Zedong certainly were revolutionary. But were the consequences revolutionary?

I have argued elsewhere that for Gandhi the burden was too heavy and for Maotzedong it was too light! Gandhi wanted to mobilise the pariahs and the shudras, not to mention the women against the top three, the brahmins and kshatriyas and vaisyas - and he was killed by a bullet fired by a non-fanatic brahmin. Mao Zedong's revolution was also against those at the top, from a Western point of view. But from a Chinese point of view it was more like mobilising the top three layers - intellectuals, peasants, workers - against the fourth, the merchants (although certainly in alliance with warlords, landowners and big business). From the point of view of social topography, Gandhi's was an uphill fight, Mao Zedong's fight was downhill. Gandhi failed, and so did Mao Zedong if the goal was modernisation: his struggle against the merchants was successful but only a pyrrhic victory, leaving the country at his death with a truncated BCI-complex.

Let us then try a slightly different approach to the same problem: the relationship between Western social history and social transformations elsewhere. Again, Table 2 may look somewhat formidable, but the logic is the same as in Table 1, only not divided in four by the compass and the map of the world, but according to type of power.

The point of departure for the whole Table is power. The assumption is that there are three basic kinds of power: normative, coercive and contractual; or the power of ideas, the power of destruction and the power of construction. But then there is also meta-power or the power over power, the power to decide what kind of power to use, or what kind of power-mix, in a given situation. These three forms of power, and the meta-power are then seen as embedded in institutions with their generic descriptions, Culture, Military, Economy and Polity.

So much for the power senders or power wielders. Power, however, is a relation: there also have to be power receivers. Leaving the outside world out, I would then see two types of power receivers: people and non-people, the latter being marginalized, not being really of the society even if they are in society.

And that gives us an answer to the question formulated above: Why do we find four classes, and one marginal group? There is a logic to it: three types of power could give rise to three types of power senders, and then there are those two types of power receivers. However, to this should then be added a level 0 at the very top, the apex of society, the point where meta-power is exercised, the summit. This is not a class. It is precisely the central point, however much it may be legitimised as being by gratia dei or an expression of vox populi (with the obvious transition formula, vox populi, vox dei).

Actually, according to this formula the second world or socialist formation should be written somewhat differently: on top the party alone as the wielder of normative power and meta-power; then the military and the police wielding coercive power, then the technocracy

Table 2: SOCIO-HISTORY AND THE EXERCISE OF POWER

	<u>Power senders</u>				<u>Power receivers</u>	
	Normative power Idea power CULTURE (1)	Coercive power Destruction power MILITARY (2)	Contractual power Construction power ECONOMY (3)	Meta-power Power over power POLITY	PEOPLE (4)	NON-PEOPLE (5)
Western traditional <u>Class</u>	clergy	aristocrats	aristocrat/burghers		workers/ peasants	marginals
<u>Institution</u>	CHURCH	MILITARY LAW	LAND/TOWN	KING/COURT		
Western modern <u>Class</u>	intelligentsia	bureaucrats	capitalists		workers/ farmers	marginals
<u>Institution</u>	UNIVERSITY	STATE	STATE/CAPITAL CORPORATIONS	PRESIDENT/ CABINET PARLIAMENT	TRADE UNIONS	LOCAL LEVEL
Hindu, traditional	<u>brahmin</u>	<u>kshatriya</u>	<u>vaishya</u>	KING/COURT	<u>shudra</u>	<u>pariah</u>
China, traditional	<u>shih</u>	<u>shih</u>	<u>shang</u>	EMPEROR/ Mandarinate	<u>nung-kung</u>	marginals
Japan, traditional	<u>shi</u>	<u>shi</u>	<u>shō</u>	EMPEROR/ shogunate	<u>nō-kō</u>	marginals

(the BCI-complex) wielding contractual power, and as n° four, the workers and the peasants. That structure is actually implicit in Table 1 already. But I have preferred a variation so as to make the gap between workers and peasants, and between partocracy and technocracy (and between non-manual and manual) more visible.

In the Table the poderes fácticos are very visible as well as their major expression, the King and his Court. So are the challengers: the university with secular knowledge challenging the sacred knowledge of the church, the State turning the military (and the police) and the administrators of law in general into state functionaries, the classical economy of a traditional society being turned into any kind of mixture between centrally planned and free market economies run by the State and the Corporations respectively. And then the basic challenge at the level of the polity itself: the President succeeding the King, the Cabinet the Court, and Parliament gradually opening itself to the people, and even to non-people. I have added Trade Unions as the power instruments of workers and peasants and the Local level as the (potential) power basis of non-people. Anyone with a sense of Western history would think of a high number of transition formulas, for instance, the nordic formula of substituting the cabinet for the court and making it responsible to Parliament, yet keeping the king, at least in the name. And those particularly interested in Spanish history will see the first challenge to the poderes fácticos after the death of Franco, in the shape of the parliament, and the obvious reaction of 23 February 1981: the attempt (serious or not serious is another matter) of a golpe in Parliament. Obviously, the second basic challenge in Spain comes from a strong State, for instance capable of levying taxes and even collecting them from people not gladly suffering such exercises. And the third challenge is already there: the university as the base for intellectual power, pushing the church into the background as a service institution for religious ritual only. Consequently, there is material for at least two more golpe attempts, one in the ministry (of finance) and another in the major university.

Let us now return to the basic points made in the first section: the four transformations took considerable time and the transformations were successive, not simultaneous. Yet, and that's the point made in the

second section above, that process is not only descriptive of Western social history, but normative for the rest of the world: what was good for the West is good for the world. Reading Western history one is struck by the enormous amount of time needed, the blood-shed, the back and forth movements, to obtain this functional transformation with so little structural change. Reading Japanese history, one is similarly impressed with how little blood was shed, how quickly the transformation took place, and how the change was not only functional but also structural, although not exactly in the same way as in the West.

To gain in perspective, let us now try to bring in the two missing social formations: muslim and tribal, the former occidental, the latter non-occidental, but both of them definitely located within the Third World as defined by Table 1. There are no traditional guidelines for the analysis of these formations, similar to those used in Table 1. On the other hand, Table 2 is a useful guide: it makes sense to ask for muslim and tribal social formations how the three types of power are exercised, how they are integrated, how the power receivers are articulating their demands and how the latter are received.